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France passed gender parity laws in 2000 stating that all political parties should include equal numbers of
men and women on party lists. Priscilla Lewis Southwell writes that despite the new laws leading
to an initial increase in female representatives, this growth has stalled in recent elections. She
argues that one of the major reasons for this is that France also implemented a number of
additional electoral reforms in 2003 which undermined the effectiveness of gender parity rules. She
calculates that the reforms may have prevented as many as 38 female candidates from being
elected since 2001.
France engaged in two inter-related, almost contradictory, types of electoral reform during the past
decade – the introduction of gender parity and the structural reform of its Senate and European parliamentary (EP)
elections. The latter reform served to thwart gender parity in several ways. The Raffarin electoral reforms of 2003
reduced the potential for the election of more female politicians, by the greater use of plurality districts in Senate
elections. In addition, the change to regional districts for elections to the European Parliament created a situation in
which male bias in party lists, even under proportional representation (PR), worked to the disadvantage of female
candidates. Party proliferation, although not widespread in Senate PR districts, also reduced the number of
successful female Senate candidates.
These developments help to explain why parity law has resulted, after one decade, in only a modest increase in the
number of female officeholders in France. My research also underscores that quota provisions can be circumvented
or minimised by other modifications of the electoral system, but it also confirms the extent to which incumbent
officeholders go to considerable lengths to remain in office.
Gender Parity in France
In 2000, a parity law was passed requiring all parties to present an equal number of female and male candidates on
the party lists for those elections conducted via proportional representation (PR) – that is, the European Parliament,
a majority of seats to the national Senate, and municipal and regional elections.
This gender parity law was first implemented in 2001, which resulted in the proportion of women town councilors
rising from 25.7 per cent to 47.5 per cent in municipalities with more than 3500 residents. Similarly, in Senate
elections, in those 74 races in which the parity law was applicable (those using PR) there was an increase from 5 to
20 female senators. In those 28 remaining Senate contests where parity was not directly applicable (those using a
two-round plurality (TRP), the number of women stayed the same, at two.
From the standpoint of gender parity, the first set of post-parity elections appeared to be moderately successful.
However, these initial gains in female representation appear to have stagnated. The percentage of women elected
to the National Assembly has continued to rise, but only modestly so. However, the most recent European
Parliamentary elections, and the 2008 Senate elections, have actually shown a slight decrease in the percentage of
women elected to office.
As a possible explanation, we can turn to other electoral reforms that were adopted shortly after the parity law – the
Raffarin reforms of 2003. Like most electoral reforms, the details are complicated, but these changes had an
adverse effect on gender parity. In 2003, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, as leader of the UMP (Union pour un
Mouvement Populaire) introduced laws that changed the method by which elections to the Senate and the EP are
conducted.
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Ségolène Royal, 2007 Parti socialiste Presidential candidate (Credit: Parti
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Changes in elections to the European Parliament:
even “zippering” didn’t help
Before these reforms, elections to the EP were
conducted by PR, with the entire nation as the sole
constituency, with national party lists. However, since
2003, there have been eight regional districts with
distinct party lists of EP candidates in each district.
Although these districts still use a PR method, this
change can reduce the chances of female candidates
being elected.
Specifically, although parity law requires party lists to
alternate men and women (a ‘zippering’ system), a
majority of party lists have been headed by male
candidates. In those situations where a party receives
only one or an uneven number of seats in a district, an
imbalance occurs in the number of male and female
candidates who actually fill those seats within their
party. Although this imbalance is slight with one national
constituency, as was the case in the 1999 elections to
the EP, the potential for such bias against female
candidates becomes larger as the number of districts
increases.
For example, the Socialist Party captured 31 seats in
the 2004 EP elections. If the country had been one
nationwide district, as in 1999, at least 15 of these
Socialist MEPs would have been required to be female by parity law. However, the disaggregation of the Socialist
vote across the country meant that, in some of these eight districts, an uneven number of seats were won by the
Socialists, resulting in a male bias. The actual Socialist delegation to the EP, following the 2004 election, was 18
male MEPs and 13 female MEPs, a loss of two potential female MEPs. The cumulative effect of such male bias for
all parties was a net loss of six female MEPs in 2004, under these new rules. A similar pattern occurred for both the
UMP and the Socialist parties in the 2009 EP election, but this male bias was offset by two smaller parties, the
Movement for Democracy (MoDem) and the Greens (Verts) who, in contrast, had a female candidate heading their
party list in three out of the eight regional districts.
It’s even worse in the French Senate elections
As noted above, the reforms for the Senate increased the number of districts that use a TRP system, as compared
with the PR method. The electoral system for this body had traditionally used a plurality (TRP) method only for those
districts with fewer than three seats to be chosen – approximately one-third of all seats (37 per cent in the 2001
Senate elections). However, the Raffarin reforms raised this threshold to three seats per district, resulting in 35 per
cent of all senators being chosen in plurality districts in the 2004 elections, and a markedly increased figure of 65
per cent in the 2008 elections. As such, the effect of this reform did not really become apparent until the later 2008
elections, although the percentage of closed-list proportional method (PR) was much higher in 2011.
Another roadblock: party proliferation
The phenomenon of ‘party proliferation’ in Senate elections involves a scenario where party members bolt from their
own party to form a new, temporary party, presumably to bypass parity requirements for PR districts. By such a
strategy, two (or more) male incumbents can avoid the parity requirements for PR districts that require the
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alternation of male and female candidates on their party lists.
Our examination of the most recent four Senate elections (2001, 2004, 2008 and 2011), reveals 18 districts out of 58
total PR districts in which certain members of the centre-right party (UMP) ran instead as a head of an alternative
party list, usually called ‘Divers Autres ’, or even with the same coalition name (LMAJ) as occurred in 2011. In each of
these 18 districts, the result was the election of one male UMP Senator, and one male ‘Autres’ Senator, rather than a
second-place female on the UMP party list, as required by the parity law. Despite the ballot identifying them as
members of different parties such as DA, their official Senate biography listed these senators as members of the
UMP party.
How many more women would have been elected? Perhaps thirty-eight?
The Table below is an estimate of how female candidates might have fared in these post-2001 elections, if the
previous electoral rules had been in place, as well as the impact of party proliferation.
Table: Estimation of the effect of the Raffarin Reforms and party proliferation on the number of women
elected to the Senate and European Parliament (2004-2011)
Note: Pearson Correlation significant at 0.05 level for both Senate and European Parliament
elections.
Source: French Ministry of the Interior
First, we can examine those Senate districts with three seats at stake, that is, those that began using a plurality
system in the 2004 election after the Raffarin reforms. Looking at these 24 districts, we can ‘re-run’ the races with
the previously-used PR system to determine whether the prior rules might have altered the gender balance of the
Senate delegation. In doing so, an assumption is made that the voters (primarily municipal councilors) would have
voted in the same manner, along party lines. The results suggest that more than 18 women would have been
elected in these three Senate elections if the Raffarin reforms had not been adopted and the previous PR method
had been used in these three-seat districts.
For example, in the Senate district of ‘Indre et Loire’ in 2011, the left-leaning preferences of voters resulted in the
election of two members of the Socialist Party and one Communist Party member – all men. Had this district used
the previous 2001 PR method, the parity law would have required the Socialist Party to have a party list with at least
one woman among the top three spots on their party list. Therefore, a minimum of one female Socialist member
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would have been elected, instead of the actual result of three male candidates in this district. In all of the four such
districts in 2011, a similar scenario occurred, resulting in the loss of four potential female Senators. For the 2004
and 2008 Senate elections, similar results occurred, but more markedly so because there were more TRP contests
in these election years – a loss of seven potential female Senators both in 2004 and 2008 — primarily because of a
change in electoral rules.
This table also incorporates the similar estimates for EP elections, and party proliferation in the 2004, 2008 and
2011 elections. That is, we looked at the actual vote totals in all these elections, but assumed that the EP elections
would have stayed nationwide, and that party members would not have been able to temporarily defect from their
own party in CPR districts. The cumulative effect of all three of these phenomena is remarkable. Had the previous
electoral rules been in effect, and had parties been prevented from running two of its candidates on different party
lists, it is likely that a substantially increased number, perhaps 38, of women would have been elected to office in
France.
Clearly, there are other possible explanations for this rather modest increase in the number of women in French
politics. However, the ‘rules of the game’ were undoubtedly an important variable. The Raffarin reforms had a
definitive impact, and, most likely, were adopted with at least awareness of the electoral consequences for parity.
Certainly, the headship bias and party proliferation did not occur unwittingly. The parliamentary debate over these
electoral reforms in 2003 indicates that one of the reasons for the adoption of the EP reform was to increase turnout
in EP elections by offering candidates with closer local ties to the voters. However, it is a bit more difficult to be
sanguine about the increase in the number of plurality districts for Senate elections, as Senators were quite open in
their opposition to parity law.
It appears that supporters of gender parity should push for a return to more proportionality in Senate elections, and
consider whether the headship of party lists should come under greater scrutiny for all PR districts, including the
eight regional EP ones. Reining in party proliferation would also be a difficult task, but unless some recognition of
these varied obstacles to parity are made by the national legislature or the largest parties, the impact of French
parity law will remain quite modest.
For a longer discussion of this topic see the author’s recent article in French Politics
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